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1 Introduction
In this paper, I study two policy questions concerning the bus transit market in the City of Helsinki. Both
questions are viewed from the perspective of the effects of competition. The first is whether the merger
of the City owned private company Suomen Turistiauto Oy and the Helsinki City Transport’s (HKL)
bus transport department, HKL-bussiliikenne, in 1.1.2005 was good policy. The second is whether, as
planned, the City should spend resources to induce more competition in this market. One possibility
that has been considered by the procurement officials is to build new City owned garages and rent these
to new entrants.
A central issue in an auction setting when assessing the effects of competition, i.e. number of bidders,
on procurement costs is whether the bidders operate in a private or a common cost environment. Common
costs refer to the situation where the relevant information about the costs of providing the contracted
services is dispersed among the bidders. In that case bidders would update their beliefs about these
costs if they learned their competitors’ signals on these costs. Private costs refer to the situation where
the bidders are only interested in their own signals when evaluating the true costs. This distinction is
called the information paradigm. The model by Milgrom and Weber (1982) (denoted MW) suggests that
the effects of competition may change with the information paradigm. This is due to a phenomenon
known as a winner’s curse. The winner’s curse refers to a situation where bidders bid in a common costs
environment only according to their own cost estimate. With unbiased estimates and symmetric bidders,
the bidder who underestimates his costs most wins the auctions and may receive a negative payoff. The
expected amount of underestimation increases with the number of bidders. Rational bidders take this
into account and thus may even bid more as competition increases. Hong and Shum (2002) find empirical
evidence of this counterintuitive effect. Strategic behavior implies that bidders bid less when the number
of bidders increases. With private costs only this strategic component is in play, whereas in common cost
setting both of these factors matter and thus then the effect of competition is not clear. This distinction
forms the basis of this study.
I perform two tests developed by Haile at al. (2003) (denoted HHS) for common costs. The setting a
is first-price sealed-bid procurement auction. The main contribution of this paper is the empirical appli-
cation and its policy implications. Novelty is achieved by extending the testing framework by allowing
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the bidders to be asymmetric. Another extension is that I use pooling to meet the data requirements.
Another aspect of interest is showing the need for robustness checks for some arbitrary choices in HHS
testing procedures. Also the discussion on potential misspecification pitfalls is of interest beyond this
application. To my knowledge this is the second study that applies the HHS methodology. In the other
(Shneyerov 2003), only the means1 test is used.
According to the Confederation of Finnish Industries (www.ek.fi 2005) public procurement in Finland
amounts to about 20 billion euros annually. This is about 15 % of GDP. In the European Union the share
of public procurement is about 16 % of GDP. Despite it’s importance, procurement from the auction
perspective has not been studied with Finnish data before. The nationality of data is important from
the policy point of view. One important goal of the procurement officials is to increase competition
(Saarelainen 2002). The increased competition is meant to lower procurement costs and increase the
quality of services. Theoretical and empirical results quoted above imply that this is not necessarily
the case if bidders have common costs. Thus different procurement rules should be implemented for
different markets. For example the EU law of open invitation to all procurements is perhaps not optimal.
Besides the effects of competition, HHS tests can be used to determine the optimal auction format. MW
show that if the winning bidder’s payoff depends on the preferences of others, implying common costs,
ascending auctions generate lower procurement costs than other auction types.
In many econometric studies the choice of the information paradigm is based on intuition. To simplify,
in situations where bidders input-output efficiency is dominant and the only uncertainty is about other
competitors’ efficiencies, one should assume private costs, whereas in situations where there exists uncer-
tainty on common elements like technological development, one should assume common costs. In their
study of London bus transit auctions Cantillon and Pesendorfer (2006b) assume and argue convincingly
for private costs. Moreover, in the auctions studied in this paper, the winners are compensated for the
changes in most input prices following the Statistics Finland bus transit cost index. This reduces uncer-
tainty about the future and thus the relative importance of common elements. Therefore the theoretical
(also technical) null hypothesis in this study is that of private costs. This null is however rejected in most
tests. This surprising result can also be due to model misspecification.
In the symmetric case the null hypothesis of the private costs paradigm is rejected in most specifica-
1Actually medians in that application.
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tions. Therefore common costs play a role in this market. When allowing for asymmetry I find that these
common costs are driven by the bus companies that have garages close to the contracted routes. This
result has an important policy implication. If planners choose between two locations, from which the
overall operation costs are equal, they should choose to build the public garage further away. Moreover
it is not clear whether this policy should be implemented at all, as the benefits of more competition are
not clear. Another implication is that the merger of the two public bus companies cannot be criticized
on the basis of it reducing competition and thus increasing procurement costs.
In practise the HHS tests are conducted in the following way. First the bidder’s expected costs
conditional on winning the auction are estimated using observed bids with structural nonparametric
methods. This follows Li et al. (2002) (denoted LPV) for the symmetric case and Campo et al. (2003)
(denoted CPV) for the asymmetric case. In the common costs setting these costs are increasing in the
number of bidders when bidders are symmetric. With asymmetric bidders and common costs this relation
is not clear. With private costs these costs are invariant in number of bidders with both symmetric and
asymmetric bidders. Therefore two tests for stochastic dominance between the cost distributions for
different numbers of bidders are conducted. In the asymmetric case also the types of the bidders in
addition to their number have to be taken into account. The interpretation of the null hypotheses also
differs in these two cases. The first test compares quantile trimmed means and utilizes bootstrapping
procedures. The second is a modified Kolmogorov-Smirnov test based on subsampling.
Besides the policy questions, the assumption on the information paradigm has severe implications
on the analysis of a given market. The HHS test is therefore also useful in determining which methods
should be applied with a given data. HHS mention three arguments why the nonparametric nature of
their tests avoids the problems with previous suggestions (e.g. Paarsch (1992), Sareen (1999), Gilley and
Karels (1981) and Hendricks at al. (2003)). The first problem is confounding testing for the information
paradigm with testing for parametric assumptions. The second is avoiding to have to base the test on
solely bids. The third is not having to test for a particular form of private and common values. Pinkse and
Tan (2005) suggest another possible alternative to testing using winning bids, but they do not develop
the test explicitly.
Although auction theory has been fairly well established for many decades (e.g. Krishna (2002) or
Milgrom (2004)), empirical work is new in comparison. Earlier empirical literature is surveyed by Laffont
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(1997) and Hendricks and Paarsch (1995). Early studies utilized mostly reduced form econometric models.
Perrigne and Vuong (1999) survey earlier methods for structural analysis of first-price auctions. Kagel
(1995) surveys experimental work on auctions. The structural empirical analysis of auctions has developed
rapidly in recent years. This literature is surveyed by Hendricks and Porter (2005), Paarsch and Hong
(2006) and Athey and Haile (2005). Paarsch (1992), Donald and Paarsch (1993,1996) and Laffont et
al. (1995) developed the first parametric structural methods. Elaykime et al. (1994) and Guerre et al.
(2000) have developed nonparametric structural methods, which LPV extended to affiliated values. Until
LPV the analysis had been confined to either common value or private value models. CPV made the
extension for identifying the asymmetric affiliated case. Bus transit data have been used previously in the
empirical auction literature by Cantillon and Pesendorfer (2006a, 2006b) who examine the efficiency of
package (or combination) bidding. Previous studies on the Helsinki bus transit market have concentrated
on the effects of the change of regime that happened in 1997 when the city started to tender the bus
transit services instead of buying them through negotiations. For example Valkama and Finkkilä (2003)
have studied economic issues like the changes in the bus companies’ economic performance. Haatainen
(2003) studied the effects on the bus companies’ personnel.
2 The theoretical model and the estimation strategy
Usually a researcher observes the bids submitted in auctions. This is unfortunately not enough to directly
infer under which information paradigm the bidders operate. With common costs the winner’s curse and
strategic behavior have opposite effects on the bids as the amount of competition changes. Pinkse and
Tan (2005) showed that in affiliated private values first price auctions the affiliation effect causes the same
response to increased competition as the winner’s curse. Therefore, to be able to test for the paradigm
we need to estimate the bidders’ costs or their conditional expectations on costs that correspond to the
bids we observe. In that way the strategic behavior is controlled for. Inference on the paradigm can be
conducted because these costs react to competition differently depending on the paradigm.
I will present only the basic idea of the model and estimation here. For more one should refer to MW,
LPV, CPV and HHS. In appendix 1 there is a longer walkthrough of the estimation for those not familiar
with the literature. It makes it possible to replicate what I have done. The tests in HHS are based on
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comparing the distributions of bidders’ expected costs conditional on winning the auction for different
numbers of bidders. For bidder i this cost is vn(Xi, Yi) = E[Ci | Xi, Yi], where Xi is a private signal of
bidder i and Yi is lowest signal among the (n− 1) other bidders. The estimation of these costs is done
following LPV and CPV. Estimated costs are called pseudo-costs.
The models are based on the assumptions that bidders use symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium
strategies and maximize their expected payoff conditional on their signal. The first order condition
is sufficient for estimation and actual strategies need not to be solved. Identification is based on the
monotonicity of bidding strategies sn(x) with respect to signals on costs x. Pseudo-costs can be estimated
from bid information alone with nonparametric methods when all bids are observed. Equation (2.1) is
the essential first order condition for equilibrium for bidder i in symmetric n bidder auction. This well
known condition is from MW. FYi,n is the distribution of Yi conditional on bidder’s own signal being x
and fYi,n is the corresponding density. See appendix 1 for the asymmetric equivalent.
(2.1) sn´(x) = [sn(x)− vn(x, x)] fYi,n(x|x)1−FYi,n(x|x) .
3 Testing
This section presents the principle of the HHS tests and the asymmetric modification. I show shortly in
appendix 2 how all the necessary calculations are made in practise. For more detail refer to HHS. HHS
base their tests on a formal definition of private and common costs.
Definition 1. Bidders have private costs if and only if E[Ci | X1, ...,Xn] = E[Ci | Xi] and bidders
have common costs if and only if E[Ci | X1, ...,Xn] strictly increases in Xj for j = i.
This definition of common costs incorporates a wide range of models with a common cost component,
not just the special case of pure common costs (HHS). HHS prove that definition 1 leads to the following
essential theorem.
Theorem 1. With private costs vn(x, x) is invariant to n for all x but with common costs and
symmetric bidders strictly decreasing in n for all x.
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In this form theorem 1 was presented in Athey and Haile (2005, p.94). HHS then show that this
implies
Corollary 1. Under the private cost hypothesis
Fv,n
−
(v) = Fv,n
−
+1(v) = ... = Fv,
_
n(v) ∀v.
Under the common cost hypothesis and with symmetric bidders
Fv,n
−
(v) > Fv,n
−
+1(v) > ... > Fv,
_
n(v) ∀v.
This forms the test hypothesis in the symmetric case. Assuming two types of bidders and letting n1
denote the number of bidders of type 1 and n0 denote the number of type 0 bidders, we can see from
Theorem 1 also that
Corollary 2. Under the private cost hypothesis and with asymmetric bidders
Fv,n0
−
,n1
−
(v) = Fv,n0
−
+1,n1
−
(v) = Fv,n0
−
+1,n1
−
+1(v) = ... = Fv,
_
n0,
_
n1
(v) ∀v.
Under the common cost hypothesis and with asymmetric bidders
Fv,n0
−
,n1
−
(v) = Fv,n0
−
+1,n1
−
(v) = Fv,n0
−
+1,n1
−
+1(v) = ... = Fv,
_
n0,
_
n1
(v) ∀v. or
Fv,n0
−
,n1
−
(v) > Fv,n0
−
+1,n1
−
(v) > Fv,n0
−
+1,n1
−
+1(v) > ... > Fv,
_
n0,
_
n1
(v) ∀v.
Thus if we observe equal distributions the information paradigm is unknown but if we observe unequal
distributions the environment must be common. This forms the test hypothesis in the asymmetric case.
This is not the entire partition of the relation set but in practise the relation in the other direction should
not be observed. Two sided tests should be conducted if counterintuitive direction is observed. The
competition in the asymmetric case must be defined correctly. There must be at least the same amount
of one type of bidders and more of the other type of bidders to be able to compare distributions with
maintaining this interpretation.
HHS then propose to use the empirical distribution function
ˆ
F v,n(y) =
1
Tn×n
∑T
t=1
∑n
i=1 1{
ˆ
vit <
y, nt = n} to conduct the tests. They explain the difficulties involved in tests that use nonparametrically
estimated pseudo-costs
ˆ
vit. HHS suggest the use of two tests. These tests are based on testing for
stochastic dominance between different empirical distributions of the estimated pseudo-costs. The null
hypothesis is that of equal distributions. The idea of their first test is to compare the distributions
horizontally using quantile trimmed means. They use block bootstrapping to calculate variances. As
Athey and Haile (2005) summarize it, the test is an adaptation of a standard multivariate one-sided
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likelihood-ratio test by Bartholomew (1959). Their second and their preferred test is a generalization
of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The idea is to compare the distributions vertically using the sum of
maximum distances as test statistic. They normalize their test statistic to be able to use subsampling to
estimate critical values. HHS also suggest recentering.
4 Market, data and misspecification
This section has three objectives. First, I describe the Helsinki metropolitan area bus transit market.
Second, I present descriptive summaries of the data. Third, and most importantly, I discuss the problems
of applying the HHS methodology to this particular data set. These problems are the small size of the
data set and the different rules used in the actual auction from the one assumed in the methods.
4.1 The Helsinki bus transit market
The Helsinki metropolitan area consists of four different cities, Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa and Kauniainen.
The population of Helsinki makes 56 percent of the total population of one million and it is the most
densely populated one. Kauniainen is practically a small suburb of Espoo. The Helsinki metropolitan
area bus transit market represents about 270 routes serving about 172 million passengers per year. It
is valued at about 300 million euros per year. The market can be divided into four parts: regional
bus transit, and the intra-city bus transit in Espoo, Helsinki and Vantaa. The Helsinki Metropolitan
Area Council (YTV) arranges the regional tenders as well as the tenders in Espoo and Vantaa. The
City of Helsinki arranges its own tenders. Both use similar rules and have for example standardized
the vehicle requirements in most respects. Intra-city traffic of Helsinki consists of 86 routes. Its share
of the total market was about 58 percent of passengers, 41 percent of bus kilometers and 59 percent of
expenditures in year 2000. The first tender was awarded in 1994 for regional transport services. The
City of Helsinki arranged its first tender in 1997, the City of Espoo tendered all its services in one go
in 1998 and the City of Vantaa did the same in 1999. Introducing tendering in the place of buying the
services through negotiations reduced the procurement costs by 15,2 % in Helsinki and more in the other
three markets (Saarelainen 2004). It is not clear what is the welfare effect of this regime change. These
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savings can be due to genuine efficiency improvements and getting rid of monopoly rents, or they can be
just transfers from employees (after the regime change media reported depreciating working conditions)
and entrepreneurs to the public sector.
The data set used in this study includes only the City of Helsinki tenders. The data consists of
64 auctions. The small number of observations causes problems with statistical inference, as both the
nonparametric estimation and the testing methods need a large number of observations to work well.
Including all the tenders of the entire metropolitan area would increase the data set to about 300 auctions.
That data is available but is not used. It can be argued that the suburban bus transit market is too
different from the urban one for the data on these markets to be treated as identical. Also the scoring
rules differed somewhat. The most important difference with the YTV data is that the bidders submitted
many more combination bids than in the City of Helsinki auctions. Problems arising from scoring and
combination bidding are discussed below.
The tendering process is as follows. First the Commercial Services Committee selects the service
operators. Then the planning unit of Helsinki City Transport (HKL) and the City of Helsinki Supplies
Department draw up and execute the competition process. HKL Bus Transport participates as one of
the contractors. HKL planning unit decides routing, timetables, vehicle requirements and fleet schedules.
HKL can change the amount of bus kilometers of a contract by a maximum of ten percent per year. The
tenders are open to all contractors who have a licence to operate in the business. Also a financial analysis
on the contractors’ ability to fulfill the tender specifications is conducted.
In bids the operators state the unit costs of the service (cost per kilometer, per hour and per vehicle
day), which the tendering authority uses to calculate the total cost of service provision which is the
actual bid. HKL receives all ticket revenues. The contract period varies from three to six years being
most often five years. The invitation to tender simultaneously covers many contracts. A single contract
can cover one or more routes. The set of contracts that correspond to an invitation is called a tranche
following Cantillon and Pesendorfer (2006a). Combination bidding within a tranche is allowed. (For
more information on bus transit tenders in Helsinki region see for example YTV Transport Department
(2001) or HKL (2006).)
The principle of awarding tenders is the best economic value that is calculated by a scoring rule based
on the bids and vehicle quality. The lowest bid gets 86 points. Other bids’ points are calculated with
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the formula: points for bid i = [lowest bid / bid i] * 86. A maximum of ten points are awarded for
vehicle quality. The principle of giving points to different vehicle characteristics is clearly stated in the
tender invitation. Two points are given for environment and quality certificates each. In the last three
invitations in the data set the scoring rule had changed so that the bid was awarded a maximum of 87
points and vehicle quality 13 points, and the certificates were obligatory.
[Table 1. about here]
The data is described in table 1. The data consists of all the intra-city bus transit tenders held in the
City of Helsinki in years 1997 - 2005. The data are collected by the author from the archives of the City
of Helsinki Supplies Department (Saarelainen 2004). The data consists of 13 tranches, 64 contracts and
261 bids of which 14 were combination bids. The number of bidders varies from two to eight. Table 2.
presents some descriptive statistics for each participating firm. Both the bid and the pseudo-cost results
seem reasonable as firms with the highest percentage of wins have the lowest average bids and costs.
The municipal bus company HKL participated in all auctions. Only five companies out of eleven were
important players. They submitted 93 percent of bids and won all but one contract.
[Table 2. about here]
4.2 Applicability of the data
The data include information on bids, scores, contract characteristics and bidder characteristics. For the
purposes of this study the information on bidders is not utilized with the exception of the location of
garages. There are several problems with the application of HHS’s tests to this data set. HHS assume
that symmetric bidders bid in independent and homogenous auctions and that the number of bidders
is exogenous and known to all bidders ex ante. The data is generated from combinatorial auction with
asymmetric bidders and multiattribute bids. Other problems are small size of the data set, observed
and unobserved contract heterogeneity and endogenous participation. The main problem arises from
the different equilibrium behavior assumed in the estimation of the pseudo-costs and the actual auction
considered here. Below some solutions are presented to alleviate the problems mentioned here. The
discussion is useful in highlighting the possible limitations to applicability of the HHS tests. These
limitations are mainly related to relying on nonparametric estimation of pseudo-costs.
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As noted before, asymmetry makes the interpretation of the null as private costs impossible. We will
see below that endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity make rejecting this null harder even when it
should be rejected. Thus when the null is not rejected it is difficult to be certain of the private costs
environment even in the symmetric case. This is unfortunate because the alternative hypothesis of com-
mon costs incorporates many different models. Therefore if private costs are rejected, the econometrician
needs to make assumptions about the exact form of the common costs environment to be able to conduct
further study on the data. Also the policy considerations are more difficult if the null is rejected because
for example the effects of more competition are unclear.
4.2.1 Multiattribute auction
The bids are multi-dimensional. As explained, bids consist of a monetary part and of a service quality part.
They are transformed into one dimension in the following way. First the price of one point is calculated
based on the scoring rule by dividing the winning bid with 86 (or 87 in the last three tranches). The same
price is reached by dividing any bid with that bidder’s price points. Then the quality points (points for
vehicle quality and points for the certificates) that each bidder has received are multiplied by this price
per point. That number is then subtracted from the bid. This method is based on the economic intuition
that an optimally behaving winning bidder submits a bid where the cost of getting a quality point equals
the expected cost of getting a monetary point.2
Asker and Cantillon (2006) have studied the properties of scoring auctions. They argued that making
bidders’ types one dimensional is sufficient for characterization of equilibrium when the scoring rule is
quasi-linear and types are independently distributed. They also suggest that their paper provides a
theoretical basis for the investigation of econometric identification of scoring auctions. However this
problem is yet to be solved in the literature. Moreover, the scoring rule used in these bus transit auctions
is not linear. Thus we need to adopt some arbitrary method like the one explained above. Cantillon and
Pesendorfer (2006a) treat quality scores in their study as noise and use only the bids for identification.
The minor importance of scores in the sense that they rarely change the order of bidders in my data
2This should hold for marginal points. If there are (dis)economies of scale in the production of quality this does not
necessary hold for intra-marginal points. Berechman (1993, p. 121-123) argues that the bus industry in general operates
under constant economies of scale with respect to fleet size.
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would support this interpretation. The subtraction done above does not cause any problems in case
the quality scores are just noise because then it is just a random downward scaling. The effect of this
reduction vanishes when the HHS homogenization method below is applied. Moreover, if the scores are
not random the above approach makes a correction that has at least the right direction.
4.2.2 Combination bids
In the City of Helsinki bus transit auctions the bidders can submit bids for packages of contracts within
a single tranche. For example one bidder submitted in the first tranche (seven contracts) single bids
for contracts 2,3,4,5,6 and 7 and a combination bid for the package consisting of contracts 6 and 7.
LPV and CPV estimation do not allow for combination bids. The possibility of combination bidding
changes equilibrium behavior. It also makes defining more competition much harder than in the case
when only single bids are allowed. Cantillon and Pesendorfer (2006a) provide a method for identification
of a combinatorial auction. Unfortunately this cannot be utilized here for two reasons. First, they assume
the private costs paradigm and in this testing procedure we need the model to allow the possibility of
affiliation and common costs. Second, the presence of combination bids is necessary for their identification
method and these are rare in my data.
In this data there are 14 combination bids of which two were winning bids, winning a total of five
contracts. Coincidentally 14 contracts out of 64 were included in these bids. Usually bidders included the
same contracts in their combinations. For example in the first tranche, contract 6 was included in four
combination bids submitted by three different firms, whereas only single bids were submitted for contract
1. A notable fact is that after the whole network had been procured once, bidders stopped submitting
bids for packages even though the rules still allowed it. Thus it can be argued that combination bids
do not play a large role in these auctions. There are three possible explanations for not submitting
combination bids. First, there can be additional costs in calculating and submitting the combination
bid. Second, there are negative cost synergies between contracts. Third, costs between the contracts are
correlated. If either of the first two explanations is plausible, the auctions can be treated as independent
and one could just omit the auctions with combinations. The third explanation is based on McAfee et
al. (1989) who mention that it is always optimal for oligopolies to use bundling if the reservation values
for products are independent. Identification with this correlation should be possible but should also be
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taken into account in the identification. At the moment this is left for further research. Now I just omit
all the auctions that were included in any of the combination bids. I am left with 50 auctions. Then I
assume that the bidders treated these 50 auctions as independent.
4.2.3 Observed contract heterogeneity
There are many important auction specific characteristics in the data. These shift the distribution of
bidder costs and therefore have to be controlled for. HHS suggest two different ways to incorporate these
observables. The first is the standard way to condition the estimation of pseudo-costs and the kernel
smoothing on these observables. Because of the curse of dimensionality, this requires much larger data
than available. The second alternative is to regress all the observed bids on the covariates and a set of
dummy variables for each number of bidders. The sum of each residual and the corresponding intercept
estimate provides an estimate of each homogenized bid. These estimates are then treated as bids in a
sample of auctions of homogenous goods. In this study the bids are homogenized by regressing them
against contract size in bus route hours, the share of articulated/bogie buses required for the contract,
the share of rush hour traffic in the contract, the length of the contract in years and dummies for the
number of bidders. This method requires the assumption that the cost structure is additively separable
in contract characteristics. Please refer to HHS for details.
Table 3 shows that there is very large variation in the sizes of the bids and also in the sizes of the
contracts. The largest bid is about 86 times larger that the smallest bid. The same is true for contract
size. The other contract characteristic also vary a lot across contracts. Therefore the need for controlling
for heterogeneity is obvious.
[Table 3. about here]
The results of the bid regression are in table 4. Contract characteristics explain about 97 % of
the variation in the bids. Besides the dominant contract size also peak hour share and the share of
articulated/bogie buses matter. The regression diagnostics (not shown) do not give rise to any large
concerns. The effect of the number of bidders on bids is not statistically significant. When bids submitted
in four or eight bidder auctions are compared to bids submitted in three bidder auctions, the effect is
almost significant. There the increase in the number of bidders decreased the bids.
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[Table 4. about here]
4.2.4 Unobserved contract heterogeneity
Observed characteristics explain most of the variation in bids. Still some important contract character-
istics that affect the costs of all bidders in a similar way might not be included. If these are observed by
the bidders the estimation of the pseudo-costs is biased. Krasnokutskaya (2004) has developed a method
to take this into account. However her model is only identified under the private costs paradigm and
is thus of no help here. Her results show that if the data generating process is actually a independent
private costs one with unobserved heterogeneity, then using LPV or CPV estimation procedures leads to
erroneous cost distributions. Wrongly estimated distributions have too low means and too high variances.
It is not known whether the bias in the means is related to the number of bidders. Thus it is not clear how
the lower means affect HHS tests. What we know is that higher variances may lead to situation where
the null is not rejected even when it should be. My application turns out to be robust to this problem
because the null is anyway rejected. However this is a serious consideration for other applications of HHS
tests.
Also, there is a property in the data that alleviates this problem. Note that the entire traffic was
tendered in the first seven tranches. Therefore the last six tranches hold, with the exception of some
new routes and those auctions omitted due to combination bidding, exactly the same contracts as those
in the first seven. Therefore there are ten identical contract pairs in the data. The only thing that is
heterogenous within the pairs is that they were auctioned some years apart from each other. Of the ten
pairs, five had a different number of bidders in them. The fact that some auctions are identical gives
more credibility to the assumption of homogenous auctions.
4.2.5 Bidder asymmetry
In bus transit auctions bidder asymmetry arises mainly from different location of garages. The closer
the routes are to the garages the less transfer kilometers the buses need to drive. Transfer means driving
the empty bus from the garage to the start of the route at beginning of the shift of a particular bus and
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driving the bus back to the garage at the end of a shift. Bidders that have a garage near the contracted
routes have an advantage. Asymmetry may also arise for other reasons such as capacity constraints.
More free capacity increases incentives to bid more aggressively. Cantillon and Pesendorfer (2006a) argue
that capacity effects may not be important for London bus route auctions, because firms have time to
adjust their capacity between the auctions and the start of the contract traffic. Similar time lags are
used in Helsinki. Also different collective labour agreements for public and private operators may affect
the firms’ relative ability to bid but these differences are marginal.
HHS’s tests assume symmetric bidders. If bidders are asymmetric and their types are not observed one
cannot distinguish between changes in the cost distributions resulting from different number of bidders
and changes resulting from different sets of bidders. HHS suggest a way to extend their methods to detect
common cost elements with asymmetric bidders. One would have to examine one bidder at a time and
construct a sequence of sets of opponents faced by each bidder. This would require a much larger data
set than available for this study. In this study I allow limited asymmetry by dividing the bidders into two
groups based on the distance of their garage to the routes under contract and treating them as symmetric
within groups. Asymmetry has to be taken into account both in the estimation of pseudo-costs and in
testing as explained before.
The distances were calculated using an internet service (http://kartat.eniro.fi/) where it is possible
to calculate road distances between street addresses in Helsinki. The gathering of results was automated
using unix shell scripts. For contracts consisting of a single route the average distance from the nearest
garage of the firm in question to the end points of the route was used. For contracts consisting of many
routes the method varied based on the amount of traffic in particular routes. This somewhat arbitrary
method is acceptable because it will not affect the selection to the groups. A median distance (11,5
kilometers) was used as a cut point in the grouping. Table 2. presents the distance descriptives for each
bus company. Note that all the bids by HKL and AAS belong to the group with small distance and
all the bids by OLA and the four companies with no garage in the area belong to the group with large
distances.
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4.2.6 Small data set, endogenous participation and pooling
Pooling means simply grouping some groups of observations. Pooling is used for two of the model
specifications for two reasons. First, there are too few auctions with two and six bidders in the data for
the use of subsampling. When the observations are pooled by treating the auctions with a small amount
of bidders as belonging to one group and the auctions with a large amount of bidders as belonging to the
other group, the entire data set can be used. Typically the results are also more robust to the choice of
subsample size with larger samples. The second reason is that pooling alleviates the problem of possible
endogenous participation as discussed below.
Pooling changes the distributions that are put to the tests in a following way. Let np = 3 denote the
cut off number of bidders when auctions are pooled into two groups.
(4.1) Pool 1:
ˆ
F v,n≤np(y) =
1
np−n
−
+1−
∑np
n=n
−
1{Tn=0}
∑np
n=n
−
ˆ
Fv,n(y)
Pool 2:
ˆ
F v,n>np(y) =
1
_
n−np−
∑_
n
n=np+1
1{Tn=0}
∑_n
n=np+1
ˆ
F v,n(y),
where the indicator function 1{} gains value one if there are no auctions with a given number of
bidders in the data.
Variation in the number of potential bidders, i.e. exogenous bidder variation, is most likely caused by
observed bidder asymmetries in this market. A disadvantage in the location of the garage might make
a bidder to perceive its probability of winning as too low to participate. Another possible reason are
capacity constraints. Bidders observe each others’ location and committed capacity. Therefore I assume
that the number of observed bidders equals the number of potential bidders. These numbers can differ due
to costs of calculating and submitting bids, a binding reserve price and unobserved contract heterogeneity.
Explicit reserve prices are not used in these auctions but the tender invitation states the possibility of
secret reserve price. I assume that the secret reserve price is not binding. This is plausible because the
city owned company participates in all the auctions. Their bids act as a de facto reserve price from the
perspective of the buyer. In theory the number of potential bidders is very large as the tender is open to
any firm meeting certain standards. Therefore it could be difficult for both the bidders and even more so
the researcher to know the number of potential bidders. However, to be able to participate competitively,
a firm needs a garage in the area. Thus it is easy to detect possible new entrants. Moreover the number
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of participating players is quite small and the same players have been in the market for a long time.
Thus it is reasonable to assume that most of the variation in the number of bidders is caused by observed
exogenous factors. There is still a risk of putting some auctions to the wrong group when estimating the
pseudo-costs. Firms could observe some potential bidders that in the end did not participate and that
the researcher is unaware of. Pooling cannot be done at the stage of estimating the pseudo-costs but it
helps at the testing stage. The chance of being put to the wrong group is reduced when pooling is used
because the groups are larger. If bidder expected the number of participating bidders to be three but it
turned out to be two, it is still in the correct pool.
HHS mention two ways in which endogenous participation may pose problems. First, if auctions with a
large number of bidders tend to be those in which the contract is known by bidders to be particularly easy
to operate, tests based on an assumption that variation in participation is exogenous can give misleading
results. This would make observing the common costs paradigm more difficult In this application the tests
suggest common costs so the results are robust to this problem. Second, nonparametric identification of
the pseudo-costs depends on n being independent of any unobservables. HHS describe a structure under
which both problems can be overcome using instrumental variables. Lacking the proper instrument it is
assumed here that participation is exogenous. This is one potential cause of model misspecification that
could drive the surprising result of common costs.
According to industry experts, small contracts that require from two to six regular 2-axel buses in
which the share of weekend traffic relative to daytime weekday traffic is small are easier for all bidders,
because the organization of traffic and fleet is easier. Also very high environmental requirements (EURO
IV emission levels instead of the usual EURO III) make some contracts difficult for all bidders. For-
tunately these are observed qualities. There are not many contracts of this type in the data. And as
mentioned above, there is variation in the number of bidders within identical contracts suggesting that
there must be at least some exogeneity in the process of participating in the bidding in the sense that
the contract properties cannot explain all participation choices. Some exogeneity is created by mergers
and acquisitions. Thus this problem is relatively small.
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4.2.7 The equilibrium assumption
Another important consideration is that the pseudo-cost estimation is based on assuming Bayesian Nash
equilibrium behavior. Some researchers find this strict rationality assumption implausible. As HHS admit,
this is not an innocuous assumption, although they claim that FPSB auctions seem particularly well suited
to this approach. Bajari and Hortacsu (2005) explore the reasonability of the equilibrium assumption and
the structural approach by experimental data. Their results encourage the use of structural econometric
tools. In this procurement setting the players are experienced companies bidding for large contracts.
Thus the assumption of rational behavior is not far fetched. Kagel and Levin (1986) find out in their
experiments that bidders learn equilibrium behavior only through experience. In my data the standardized
variances of bids were much larger in the first tranche than later. This could imply learning. Due to the
small size of the data set I still do not remove the first tranche from the data.
4.2.8 Collusion
Collusion would make testing impossible unless both all the bidders and the researcher knew the colluders
and the type of collusion. It would change the equilibrium and make defining more competition difficult.
In this case collusion is unlikely as it would yield very low rents. The most important bidder is a public
company. Therefore it has no incentives to collude and its bids would bound the profits from colluding.
The other fact that supports competitive bidding is the very low accounting profits that the bidders have
in this market.
5 Empirical results
In this section I present the results of three different testing specifications. The first is the standard
approach presented in HHS where there are symmetric bidders and pooling is not used. The second is
the symmetric case with pooling and the third is the asymmetric case with pooling. I present the central
results in the text. Robustness checks are presented in appendixes 4-6. Due to the small amount of
observations with a given number of bidders, the actual data that is used in the analysis differs from
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one specification to another. The original data set is Tn´ = [6(n = 2), 19(n = 3), 11(n = 4), 11(n =
5), 2(n = 6), 1(n = 8)]. I drop the lone eight bidder auction from all the specifications. I use only
T dn´ = [19(n = 3), 11(n = 4), 11(n = 5)] in the standard approach with subsampling. When I use pooling
the auctions with three or fewer bids are treated as belonging to one group and auctions with four to six
bidders to the other group. I also use pooling in the asymmetric case. There I compare the 10 auctions
with two near bidders and three far bidders (i.e. n0 = 2, n1 = 3) to the pool that consists of the 6 auctions
with (n0 = 2, n1 = 2), the 5 auctions with (n0 = 1, n1 = 2) and the 8 auctions with (n0 = 2, n1 = 1).
This guarantees that there is no ambiguity in comparing the distributions, because the group with a large
number of bidders has at least an equal number of bidders of one type and more of the other type than
all the auctions in the group with the smaller number of bidders. The means test is conducted with all
these testing specifications.
5.1 Testing specification 1: The standard approach
5.1.1 Auctions with two to six bidders
In this model all the distributions for different numbers of bidders are treated separately. Asymmetry is
not taken into account. It is not clear from figure 1. whether one should suspect common costs. Based
on the picture alone the stochastic dominance is not clear as the lines cross. On the other hand, for the
majority of observations
ˆ
F v,n(v) >
ˆ
F v,n+1(v) > ... >
ˆ
F v,
_
n(v) holds.
[Figure 1. about here]
For this model I use only the means test because there a too few two and six bidder auctions for
the use of the subsampling procedure. The test statistics and the p-values for different quantiles are
presented in table 5. The null hypothesis of private costs is not rejected when the quantile is chosen to be
5 %. When the trimmed amount is increased the null is rejected. This is due to decreasing bootstrapped
standard deviations.
It is very important to note that there are qualitative changes in the inference that depends on the
choice of the amount trimmed. HHS assume that the choice of quantile is arbitrary as it does not matter
18
asymptotically. A data driven method for choosing the quantile should be formulated. One possibility
would be to look at simulations for a reasonable quantile to trim using the same sample size and bandwidth
selection rule as in estimating the pseudo-costs. Monte Carlo simulations would reveal whether we could
find some rules of thumb for choosing the quantile.
[Table 5. about here]
5.1.2 Auctions with three, four or five bidders.
To be able to use the sup-norm test I conduct the standard testing procedure also with a smaller data
set. I use only auctions to which three to five bidders have participated. Again there is non-conclusive
evidence against the null in figure 2. For most of the values of v
ˆ
Fv,n=3(v) <
ˆ
Fv,n=4(v) implying that
the null cannot be rejected. Then again
ˆ
F v,n=5(v) gains the smallest values of the three distributions
through most of the range of v, implying rejection.
[Figure 2. about here]
Compared to the previous exercise, the means test for the sample with only 3-5 bidder auctions gives
larger p-values. These are mostly due to dropping the six bidder auctions. Again the means test is not
robust to the choice of the quantile. The rejection of the null depends on the trimming choice. The
sup-norm test clearly rejects the null and is quite robust as can be seen from appendix 3.
[Table 6. about here]
Many choices concerning subsampling that are arbitrary can affect the results. These choices are the
subsample size, the number of subsamples taken and which repetition of the test to use. Most notably
the choice of the subsample size can change the results. In theory, the subsample size should be far away
from both 1 and T. Linton et al (2005) suggest computing a plot of p-values against subsample sizes for a
range of subsample sizes. If the p-value is insensitive to subsample size within a "reasonable" range, then
inferences are likely to be robust. Regarding the number of subsamples taken there is a trade-off between
the computer time and the robustness of the result. We can be pretty sure of getting a correct and robust
result with 5000 draws but not necessarily with 50 draws. The p-value also changes from one push of
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the button to the next. Therefore one should also check whether the p-value is robust to repeating the
test with the chosen subsample size and the number of draws. Appendixes 3-5 present these robustness
checks for the different specifications. It is important to be aware of these problems with robustness and
to discuss the choices that are made. Monte Carlo simulations could reveal important information on
how to make these choices.
5.2 Testing specification 2: Pooling with symmetry
Now I pool the auctions into two groups. The first pool includes the auctions with two or three bidders,
and the second pool includes the auctions with four, five and six bidders. The distributions for the two
pools are presented in figure 3. It gives no clear evidence concerning the information paradigm as the
lines cross. The test statistics and the p-values are in table 7. Pooling changes the results of the means
test significantly. This time it does not reject the null. The sup-norm test gives very similar values as
before and rejects the null at the 5 % significance level. Both tests seem to be very robust to the arbitrary
choices.
[Figure 3. about here]
[Table 7. about here]
The results from the sup-norm tests for all the symmetric specifications clearly indicate that the bid-
ders operate in a common costs environment. The means tests give ambiguous results. HHS indicates the
sup-norm test as their preferred test. I conclude that the symmetric results show evidence of common
costs. This leads to clear answers to the policy questions of this study. The merger of the two bus
companies might have no effects, or even a decreasing effect, on the procurement costs due to decreasing
competition. For sure it has a lesser increasing effect than feared. Thus from the perspective of compe-
tition this merger cannot be criticized. The reasons for the merger remain valid. These include getting
more distance between the planner (HKL planning unit) and one bidder (HKL bus transit), synergies
and getting rid of having two companies with the same owner in these auctions. The other policy activity
currently under consideration, that is building of city owned garages and renting them to new entrants
to induce more competition, should not necessarily be undertaken. It is not clear that new competition
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brings any benefits to the city in the form of savings in procurement costs. Therefore the city might be
better off not spending any resources to induce new competition.
5.3 Testing specification 3: Pooling with asymmetry
To control for asymmetry the observations are grouped according to the distance from a given bidder’s
nearest garage to the route under contract. Both tests are then conducted separately for the different
groups. Now the pseudo-costs are estimated using the asymmetric set up. I omitted one auction with
one near bidder and two far bidders from the sup-norm test from the data because it had one unusually
small outlier value for the pseudo-cost. Table 8 presents the pooling rule I used in the testing.
[Table 8. about here]
Figure 4 shows the distributions for the small distance group. It clearly implies common costs because
the distribution for the pool with a small number of bidders gets larger or about equal values throughout
the entire range of observed values. This is confirmed by the test results in table 9. Both tests reject the
null hypothesis of private costs. Both tests work well from the robustness point of view for both of the
distance groups as can be seen from appendix 5.
[Figure 4. about here]
[Table 9. about here]
Figure 5 presents the distributions for the two pools for the bidders with garages located far from
the routes. It shows very clearly that there is no need even to test the difference in distributions for this
group as there is no observable difference in them. It is still interesting to compare the p-values with
other testing specifications and thus the tests are nonetheless conducted. The results in table 10 confirm
the expectations. Neither of the tests rejects the null of equal distributions. The means test gives higher
p-values.
[Figure 5. about here]
[Table 10. about here]
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Asymmetric results mean that the bus companies operating from garages far from the routes could
operate either in the private or the common cost environment and bus companies that have garages near
the routes operate in the common cost environment. We also know that even if also far operators had
common costs, the common cost elements are more important to the near bidders. Thus if there are
any procurement cost reducing the effects of competition, they are larger for the far operators. All the
conclusions made for the symmetric case remain valid with asymmetry taken into account. Moreover it
is now possible to make additional conclusions on the two policy questions.
First, the two merged companies were more often near than far bidders. Thus the merger reduced
the number of bidders to whom the common cost elements were more important. This actually makes
the policy of inducing more competition more plausible because now the role of common elements in the
market is diminished. Second, if the city chooses to pursue the proposed garage policy, and they have
to choose between two locations from which the overall operation costs are equal, they should choose
the garage which is more often located further away from the routes. Then at least the new entrants
react to the increased competition themselves. For the behavior of the incumbents the location does not
matter because assuming similar overall operating costs, incumbents do not perceive the new bidders or
locations as strong or weak. The only difference is along the common or private costs dimension.
6 Conclusions
Due to the small number of observations in the data relative to the requirements of the econometric
methods and the arbitrary treatment applied to the data to take combination bidding and the scoring
rule into account, the results of this study should treated be with caution. The means test was not robust
to the choice of the quantile trimmed in the symmetric case in a sense that the p-values varied a lot with
it and there were also qualitative changes. HHS assume that the choice of the quantile is arbitrary as
it does not matter asymptotically. For the sup-norm test robustness checks should be conducted with
regards to the subsample size, the number of subsamples taken and for different repetitions of the test.
The results for the symmetric testing approach show that there seem to be important common cost
elements in this market. The asymmetric approach gave very clear and robust results. It seems that the
bus companies that have garages close to the contracted routes operate in an common cost environment.
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Because the equal distributions hypothesis was not rejected for bus companies that have garages far
from these routes, the information environment is not known for them. Common costs elements are
more important to operators with garages near the routes. Common costs can arise from common future
uncertainty and private costs from individual efficiency differences. Next I provide explanations for this
result.
The garages that are most often located near the routes are also closer to the city center where the
costs of the land needed for the garage is higher. Land rents or opportunity costs of land are subject to
future uncertainty. Unlike for example gasoline price changes, changes in the land rents are not covered
by the contract terms. For example an operator with obligations to operate routes requiring a total of 50
buses for the next five years could face significant changes in production costs if the land rents increase.
Another factor is that being located near the route makes the incentives to be efficient in organizing the
empty transfer traffic lower. This makes the private cost component less important. When garages are
far the uncertainty concerning the rents are smaller and the need to be more efficient is higher.
Another element that could be driving common costs are outside options. Bidders also participate in
auctions for the metropolitan transit. When they commit their garages to traffic in one contract they
reduce their changes to participate and win in following auctions. Uncertainty about winning future
contracts is common. There could also be common uncertainty about the results of future negotiations
with the labour unions. There could be strikes or some new frictions that are not covered by the contract.
The industry also suffers from undersupply of driver labour (Helsingin Sanomat 29.1.2007 and 12.2.2007).
Therefore it is not clear whether the bidders get enough drivers if they win contracts. This also creates
common uncertainty.
Valkama and Finkkilä (2003) study the economic effects of starting tendering of bus services in the
Helsinki Metropolitan Area. They analyze firm accounting data from 1998 to 2001. They found that
tendering reduced the firms’ profits dramatically. For a while firms made positive total profits because of
the old negotiated contracts but the tendered traffic induced losses. In year 2001 the firms operated with
losses. For example operating margin, net income and return on capital were negative. In 2003 the firms
on average managed to break even and they have made small profits after that (see for example (HKL
2006)). This time series can be evidence of aggressive competition for market shares in the beginning.
But it also could be evidence for common costs. It took time for firms to learn to take the winner’s curse
23
effect into account sufficiently enough to avoid losses.
The symmetric result leads to clear answers to the policy questions posed in this study. A decrease
in competition caused by the merger of the two bus companies could have no effects or even an reducing
effect on the procurement costs. For sure it has a lesser increasing effect than feared. Thus from the
perspective of competition this merger decision cannot be criticized. The reasons for the merger remain
valid. These include getting more distance between the planner (HKL planning unit) and one bidder
(HKL bus transit department), synergies and getting rid of having two companies with the same owner
in these auctions. The other policy activity currently under consideration, that is building of city owned
garages and renting them to new entrants to induce more competition, should not be undertaken. It is
not clear that new competition brings any benefits. Therefore the city should not spend any resources
to induce new competition. Asymmetric results make it possible to make additional conclusions on these
two policy questions. First, the two merged companies were more often near than far bidders. Thus the
merger reduced the number of bidders to whom the common cost elements were more important. This
actually makes the policy of inducing more competition more plausible because now the role of common
elements in the market is diminished. Second, if the city chooses to pursue the proposed garage policy,
and they have to choose between two locations from which the overall operation costs are equal, they
should choose the garage which is more often located further away. Then at least the new entrants react
to the increased competition themselves. For the behavior of the incumbents the location does not matter
because assuming similar overall operating costs, incumbents do not perceive the new bidders or locations
as strong or weak in general.
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Table 1. The bus transit tenders included in the data set.
Tranche # auctions Size # S bids # C bids min - max
1/I (97-98) 7 4.9 34 5 3-8
1/IA (98) 1 0.02 4 0 4
1/II (98) 7 7.5 23 1 2-6
1/III (98-99) 1 0.4 8 0 8
1/IV (99) 9 7.7 33 4 2-6
1/V (00) 8 7.5 25 3 2-5
1/VI (01) 5 5.4 18 1 2-4
2/I (01) 3 2.8 11 0 3-5
2/II (02) 5 5.6 21 0 3-5
2/III (03) 5 0.7 20 0 3-5
2/IV (03) 4 3.6 18 0 3-5
2/V (05) 8 7.9 27 0 3-4
2/VI (05) 1 0.1 5 0 5
Total 64 54 247 14 2-8
"Tranche" refers to the set of contracts that correspond to an single invitation to tender. The year the
auction was held is in parentheses. 2/III means the third tranche of the second round of tendering of the
entire traffic. "# auctions" refers to the number of auctions in a given tranche. Size gives the total size
of all the contracts in a given tranche in millions of bus kilometers in a year. "# S bids" means the total
number of single bids in a given tranche. "# C bids" means the total number of combination bids in a
given tranche. "min - max" refers to the spread of the number of bidders per auction in a given tranche.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics on the distances from garages to routes, the homogenized bids and the
estimated pseudo-costs for each participating firm.
Firm HKL CX STA CR PKL OLA
# bids 50 46 26 37 16 4
# winning bids 19 5 8 12 5 0
mean 5,9 13,7 7,3 13,0 18,0 14,2
std. deviation 1,9 2,3 3,3 2,6 2,3 1,2
min 2,9 6,9 3,3 8,5 13,5 12,6
max 10,5 17,7 20,0 20,1 20,9 15,1
mean 99 187 120 110 56 529
std. deviation 223 187 196 177 101 570
min -417 -86 -243 -226 -101 1
max 1234 751 645 699 239 1256
# missing values* 1 0 0 0 0 2
mean -160 55 -16 -69 -78 46
std. deviation 456 260 329 302 211 64
min -2588 -431 -818 -747 -460 1
max 335 751 645 699 239 91
# missing values* 22 23 10 16 7 3
mean -413 29 -64 -72 -31 159
std. deviation 1498 178 312 198 193 NA
min -7892 -345 -681 -365 -259 159
max 231 297 645 279 239 159
Firm LLR AAS LSL ESL AAD Total
# bids 2 2 2 2 1 188
# winning bids 0 0 0 1 0 50
mean NA 6,2 NA NA NA 11,3
std. deviation NA 1,0 NA NA NA 5,4
min NA 5,5 NA NA NA 2,9
max NA 7,0 NA NA NA 20,9
mean 579 97 205 115 301 139
std. deviation 77 20 283 143 NA 216
min 524 83 5 14 301 -417
max 633 111 405 216 301 1256
# missing values* 1 0 1 0 0 5
mean 524 85 5 26 258 -46
std. deviation NA 3 NA 269 NA 343
min 524 83 5 -164 258 -2588
max 524 87 5 216 258 751
# missing values* 2 2 2 0 0 87
mean NA NA NA 19 301 -131
std. deviation NA NA NA 280 NA 820
min NA NA NA -179 301 -7892
max NA NA NA 216 301 645
Pseudo-costs assuming asymmetry
Pseudo-costs assuming asymmetry
Homogenized quality adjusted bids
Pseudo-costs assuming symmetry
Pseudo-costs assuming symmetry
Distance from the nearest carage to the contracted route(s) (km)
Distance from the nearest carage to the contracted route(s) (km)
Homogenized quality adjusted bids
HKL = Helsingin Kaupungin Bussiliikenne. CX = Connex Oy. STA = Suomen Turistiauto. CR =
Concordia Oy. PKL = Pohjolan Kaupunkiliikenne. OLA = Oy Liikenne Ab. LLR = Linjaliikenne
Randell. AAS = Askaisten Auto. LSL = LS-Liikennelinjat Oy. ESL = Etelä-Suomen Linjaliikenne. AAD
=Auto Andersson Oy. *The five missing values for the symmetric case are due to zeros in the denominator
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gˆ∗B1,n(b; b). The statistical program gives zero for some values of this kernel density estimator, because
there are very few observations spread over a large area. Some of the missing values for the asymmetric
case are also caused by this. Most of them however arise from the fact that I estimate the asymmetric
case only for 34 auctions whereas the symmetric case is estimated for 50 auctions.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the homogenizing regression.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Quality adjusted bids (mil. 2001 €) 1.75 1.16 0.06 5.19
Route hours per year (thousands) 42.5 27.8 1.3 111.2
Share of peak hour traffic 0.39 0.23 0 1
Share of articulated/bogie buses 0.23 0.36 0 1
Contract length (years) 4.78 0.69 3 6
In addition to these variables there are also dummies for the number of bidders. There are 6 two bidder
auctions, 19 three bidder auctions, 11 four bidder auctions, 11 five bidder auctions, 2 six bidder auctions
and 1 eight bidder auction in the data set used for this regression.
Table 4: The OLS results of explaining bids with contract characteristics. The bids are in units of
1000 euros.
Coefficient Estimate Std. Error P-value
Intercept 190 146 0.19
Route hours 0.04 0.00073 <2e-16
Peak hour share 196 84.9 0.022
Artic./Bogie buses share 179 51 0.00057
Contract length -47.2 29.6 0.11
n=2 -42.4 69 0.54
n=3
n=4 -88.2 45.5 0.054
n=5 -53.6 42.3 0.21
n=6 -88.6 71.9 0.21
n=7
n=8 -166 99.4 0.096
Adjusted R2
F-statistic
0.965
576 (9 and 178 df)
Reference group
No observations
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Figure 1. The empirical cumulative distributions of pseudo-costs for different numbers of bidders.
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Figure 1. draws
ˆ
F v,n(y) =
1
Tn×n
∑T
t=1
∑n
i=1 1{
ˆ
vit < y, nt = n} separately for each n = 2, ..., 6.
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Table 5. Quantile trimmed means, bootstrapped standard deviations, the test statistics and the p-
values from the means test for the full sample.
n T qtm sd X2-bar p-value
2 6 -26 61
3 19 -34 46
4 11 -76 44 6.14 0.07084
5 11 29 39
6 2 56 36
2 6 -26 34
3 19 -35 36
4 11 -67 28 17.32 0.00037
5 11 24 29
6 2 49 13
2 6 -19 27
3 19 -21 22
4 11 -47 18 38.01 1.9E-08
5 11 20 18
6 2 42 0.9
quantile=5%
quantile=10%
quantile=20%
"n" refers to the number of bidders and "T" to the number of auctions with given number of bidders.
"qtm" gives the quantile trimmed mean and "sd" its bootstrapped standard deviation. "χ2-bar" is the
test statistic for the given quantile.
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Figure 2. The empirical cumulative distributions of pseudo-costs for three, four and five bidders.
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Table 6. The test statistics and the p-values from the means and the sup-norm tests for auctions with
3-5 bidders.
Quantile 5 % Quantile 10 % Quantile 20 %
X2-bar 2.87 4.71 6.38
p-value 0.224 0.096 0.043
p-value
Sup-norm test (subsample sizes 9 and 6)
0.006
Means test
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Figure 3. The empirical cumulative distributions of pseudo-costs for different numbers of bidders,
with two to three and four to six bidder auctions pooled.
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The distribution for the pool 1 is
ˆ
F v,n≤3(y) =
1
2
∑3
n=2
ˆ
Fv,n(y) and for the pool 2
ˆ
F v,n>3(y) =
1
3
∑6
n=4
ˆ
F v,n(y).
Table 7. The test statistics and the p-values from the means and the sup-norm tests for the pooled
groups.
Quantile 5 % Quantile 10 % Quantile 20 %
X2-bar 0.22 0.40 0.45
p-value 0.76 0.68 0.64
p-value 0.014
Means test
Sup-norm test (both subsample sizes 9)
31
Table 8. Pooling rule and number of auctions for each distribution under comparison.
pool d s l n T # bids Tpool
1 large 2 3 5 10 30 10
2 large 2 2 4 6 12
2 large 2 1 3 5 5 18
2 large 1 2 3 7 14
3 small 2 3 5 10 20 10
4 small 2 2 4 6 12
4 small 2 1 3 5 10 18
4 small 1 2 3 7 7
The auctions are pooled into four groups. For example pool one consists of bidders with large (over
11.5 km) distance ("d") from garage to a given route in auctions with number of short distance bidders
"s" two and number of large distance bidders "l" three. "n" denotes the total number of bidders. "T"
denotes the number of auctions of given type and "# bids" the number of bids that goes to a given pool
from a given auction. "Tpool" denotes the number of auctions in a given pool.
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Figure 4. The empirical cumulative distributions of pseudo-costs for bidders belonging to the small
distance group G0. 10 auctions with (n0 = 2, n1 = 3) are compared to pool that consists of 6 auctions
with (n0 = 2, n1 = 2), 5 auctions with (n0 = 1, n1 = 2) and 8 auctions with (n0 = 2, n1 = 1).
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Distribution for pool 1 is
ˆ
F v,(n0,n´1)=(2,3),d≤11,5(y) and for pool 2
1
3
ˆ
[F v,(n0,n´1)=(2,2),d≤11,5(y) +
ˆ
F v,(n0,n´1)=(2,1),d≤11,5(y) +
ˆ
F v,(n0,n´1)=(1,2),d≤11,5(y)].
ˆ
F v,(n0,n´1)=(s,l),d≤11,5(y) =
1
T(n0,n1)=(s,l)×n1
∑T(n0,n1)=(s,l)
t=1
∑n1
i=1 1{
ˆ
v1it < y, (n0, n1) = (s, l)}.
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Table 9. The test statistics and the p-values from the means and the sup-norm tests for the group
with garages located near the routes.
Quantile 5 % Quantile 10 % Quantile 20 %
X2-bar 6.04 8.67 14.77
p-value 0.032 0.008 0.0004
p-value
Means test
Sup-norm test (subsample sizes 9 and 5)
0.002
Figure 5. The empirical cumulative distributions of pseudo-costs for bidders belonging to the large
distance group G1. 10 auctions with (n0 = 2, n1 = 3) are compared to a pool that consists of 6 auctions
with (n0 = 2, n1 = 2), 5 auctions with (n0 = 1, n1 = 2) and 8 auctions with (n0 = 2, n1 = 1).
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Empirical cumulative distributions of pseudo-costs for large distance group
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Distribution for pool 3 is
ˆ
F v,(n0,n´1)=(2,3),d>11,5(y) and for pool 4
1
3
ˆ
[F v,(n0,n´1)=(2,2),d>11,5(y) +
ˆ
F v,(n0,n´1)=(2,1),d>11,5(y) +
ˆ
F v,(n0,n´1)=(1,2),d>11,5(y)].
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ˆ
F v,(n0,n´1)=(s,l),d>11,5(y) =
1
T(n0,n1)=(s,l)×n0
∑T(n0,n1)=(s,l)
t=1
∑n0
i=1 1{
ˆ
v0it < y, (n0, n1) = (s, l)}.
Table 10. The test statistics and the p-values from the means and the sup-norm tests for the group
with garages located far from the routes.
Quantile 5 % Quantile 10 % Quantile 20 %
X2-bar 0.09 0.25 0.00
p-value 0.86 0.75 1.00
p-value
Means test
Sup-norm test (subsample sizes 9 and 5)
0.53
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Appendix 1. The theoretical model and structural estimation
The tests in HHS are based on comparing the distributions of estimated bidders’ expected costs
conditional on winning the auction, called pseudo-costs. The estimation of these costs is done following
LPV and CPV. The models are translated to a procurement setting. In notation I use only probabilities
because that is the easiest way to present the procurement version of CPV. The analysis of these models
is driven by the affiliation assumption (see MW). Roughly, affiliation means that a high value of one
bidder’s cost estimate makes high values of other bidder’s cost estimates more likely. Thus bidders would
adjust their behavior if they learnt other bidders’ signals.
LPV and CPV use a special case of the affiliated values (AV) model that was introduced by Wilson
(1977) and generalized by MW. The restricted model is called the affiliated private values (APV) model.
The AV model incorporates the entire range of models that HHS include in their testing framework. The
estimation of pseudo-costs is however done using the APV model. It is still plausible to discuss things
in the more general AV framework, as HHS do, because of the following discussion in LPV, page 175:
"Laffont and Vuong (1996) noted that any AV model is observationally equivalent to some APV model.
Thus there is no loss in explaining bids by restricting the set of models to APV models. In particular
as noted by Laffont and Vuong (1996), any pure common value model is observationally equivalent to
an APV model. In this sense the APV model does not exclude a priori the common value model ...
APV model constitutes the most general framework identified from observed bids". Here I discuss the
estimation in the APV setting. In the text I follow HHS and use the AV terminology.
The symmetric case
This model is a translation from LPV. Consider an auction in which n symmetric risk-neutral bidders
compete for a single procurement contract. In the AV model the cost of fulfilling a contract for bidder i
is Ci = ci(S, vi) where vi denotes the private signal and S is a common component. In the APV model
ci(S, vi) = vi. Private costs vi are affiliated. Competitive behavior is identified with symmetric Bayesian
Nash equilibrium strategies si(vi) which are increasing and differentiable. Bidder i chooses bid bi to
maximize expected profits conditional on own information vi.
(A1.1) maxbi(bi − vi)Pr(yi ≥ s−1(bi)|vi),
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where yi = minj =i vj . It can be shown that the first order condition for equilibrium is
(A1.2) Pr(yi ≥ s−1(bi)|vi) + (bi − vi)[ δPr(yi≥s
−1(bi)|vi)
δyi
1
s´(s−1(bi))
] = 0
This condition is sufficient for estimation. Guerre at al. (2000) provide the identification result used
in LPV. It based on the strict monotonicity of s().
(A1.3) Pr(yi ≥ s−1(bi)|vi) = Pr(Bi ≥ B|bi = b),
where Bi denotes the lowest bid among bidder i’s opponents, formally Bi = minj =i bj . It follows that
(A1.4) δPr(Bi≥B|bi=b)δB =
δPr(yi≥s
−1(bi)|vi)
δyi
1
s´(s−1(bi))
Using these two equations, (A1.2) can be written as
(A1.5) vi = bi +
Pr(Bi≥B|bi=b)
δPr(Bi≥B|bi=b)/δB
As pointed out in CPV, noting that conditioning on b disappears from (A1.5), it can be interpreted
as
(A1.6) vi = bi − Pr(Bi≥b,bi=b)Pr(Bi=b,bi=b)
This can be estimated using nonparametric techniques. Knowing point estimates of vi is sufficient for
the HHS testing approach.
Let hG and hg denote bandwidths and K() a kernel function. bit represents the bid made by bidder
i in auction t, and Bit represents the lowest bid among i’s opponents in auction t. In the symmetric
case the pseudo-cost
ˆ
vit are estimated with the equation A1.7. The sum from t to T goes trough all the
auctions with a given n, n ≥ 2. The estimation is conducted separately for each n. In the symmetric
case I use 49 auctions. The vector Tn´ = [6(n = 2), 19(n = 3), 11(n = 4), 11(n = 5), 2(n = 6)] describes
the total number of auctions for each n.
(A1.7)
ˆ
vit ≡
ˆ
ξ(bit) = bit − Gˆ(b,b)gˆ(b,b) , where
Gˆ(b, b) = 1T×hG×n
∑T
t=1
∑n
i=1K(
b−bit
hG
)1{Bit > b} and
gˆ(b, b) = 1T×h2g×n
∑T
t=1
∑n
i=1K(
b−bit
hg
)K( b−Bithg ).
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The asymmetric case
This follows CPV translated to the procurement setting. I assume two different groups: group G0
consists of the bidders that have garages near the routes and group G1 includes the bidders that have
garages far from the contracted route. The bidders are assumed to be symmetric within each group. G0
consists of n0 bidders and G1 of n1 bidders, with n1 + n2 = n ≥ 2. If either n1 or n0 is equal to zero,
the estimation procedure reduces to the one presented above for the symmetric case. The estimation
equations also simplify somewhat if bidder i is the only bidder in either of the groups. The analysis must
be performed separately for each given pair (n1, n0) because the bidding strategy of any bidder depends
on both the number and the types of his opponents. Let v1i denote the costs of the bidders belonging to
G1 and v0i the costs of the bidders in G0. Bidders draw their costs from an n-dimensional cumulative
distribution F (). Marginal distributions may vary across subgroups. I present the model, identification
and estimation strategy here only for the group G1 as bidding strategy is analogous for group G0. One
should refer to CPV for more details.
Let y∗1i = minj =i,j∈G1 v1j and y0i = minj∈G0 v0j . Then the problem for any bidder i of type 1 can be
written as
(A1.8) maxb1i(b1i − v1i)Pr(y∗1i ≥ s−11 (b1i) and y0i ≥ s−10 (b1i)|v1i).
Differentiating with respect to b1i, the equilibrium strategy for any G1 bidder i satisfies the first-order
differential equation
(A1.9) Pr(y∗1i ≥ s−11 (b1i) and y0i ≥ s−10 (b1i)|v1i)
+(b1i − v1i)[ δPr(y
∗
1i≥s
−1
1 (b1i) and y0i≥s
−1
0 (b1i)|v1i)
δy∗1i
1
s1´(s
−1
1 (b1i))
+
δPr(y∗1i≥s
−1
1 (b1i) and y0i≥s
−1
0 (b1i)|v1i)
δy0i
1
s0´(s
−1
0 (b1i))
] = 0
for all v1i in their support, where b1i = s1(v1i).
The identification of the model for G1 rests on the following equality:
Pr(y∗1i ≥ s−11 (b1i) and y0i ≥ s−10 (b1i)|v1i)
= Pr(B∗1i ≥ B and B0i ≥ B|b1i = b),
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where B∗1i and B0i denote the lowest bids of bidder i’s opponents, formally B
∗
1i = minj =i,j∈G1 b1j and
B0i = minj∈G0 b0j . Again this equality is due to the strict monotonicity of s(). It follows that
δPr(B∗1i≥B and B0i≥B|b1i=b)
δB =
[
δPr(y∗1i≥s
−1
1 (b1i) and y0i≥s
−1
0 (b1i)|v1i)
δy∗1i
1
s1´(s
−1
1 (b1i))
+
δPr(y∗1i≥s
−1
1 (b1i) and y0i≥s
−1
0 (b1i)|v1i)
δy0i
1
s0´(s
−1
0 (b1i))
]
Using these two equations (A1.9) can be written as
(A1.10) v1i = b1i +
Pr(B∗1i≥B and B0i≥B|b1i=b)
δPr(B∗1i≥B and B0i≥B|b1i=b)/δB
Again this can be estimated using nonparametric techniques. Below I assume that bidder i belongs
to group G1 and that n1 ≥ 2 and n0 ≥ 1.
As pointed out in CPV, first note that conditioning on b1 disappears from (A1.10) and that it can be
interpreted as
(A1.11) v1i = b1i − Pr(B
∗
1i≥b and B0i≥b,b1i=b)
Pr(B∗1i=b and B0i≥b,b1i=b)+Pr(B
∗
1i≥b and B0i=b,b1i=b)
The numerator can estimated non-parametrically by
ˆ
G1(b1, b1, b1). The denominator is estimated by
the sum of
ˆ
D11(b1, b1, b1) and
ˆ
D12(b1, b1, b1). The sum from t to T goes trough the given pair (n1, n0)
of the two bidder types. b1it represents the bid made by bidder i of type 1 in auction t, B
∗
1it and
B0it denote the lowest bids of bidder i’s opponents in auction t, formally B∗1it = minj =i,j∈G1 b1jt and
B0it = minj∈G0 b0jt.
(A1.12)
ˆ
v1it = b1it −
ˆ
G1(b1,b1,b1)
ˆ
D11(b1,b1,b1)+
ˆ
D12(b1,b1,b1))
, where
ˆ
G1(b1, b1, b1) =
1
T×hG1×n1
∑T
t=1
∑n1
i=1 1{B∗1it ≥ b1}1{B0it ≥ b1}K( b1−b1ithG1 ),
ˆ
D11(b1, b1, b1) =
1
T×h2g1×n1
∑T
t=1
∑n1
i=1K(
b1−B
∗
1it
hg1
)1{B0it ≥ b1}K( b1−b1ithg1 ) and
ˆ
D12(b1, b1, b1) =
1
T×h2g1×n1
∑T
t=1
∑n1
i=1 1{B1it ≥ b1}K( b1−B0ithg1 )K( b1−b1ithg1 ).
Considering the choice of kernel and bandwidth, in both cases LPV is followed modified by assumption
5 of HHS. A triweight kernel K(u) = 3532(1− u2)31{| u |≤ 1} is used. The choice of kernel does not have
much effect in practise. For bandwidths Silverman’s rule of thumb (Silverman 1986) is used. Bandwidths
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are of the form h = hg = hG = cG(nT )
−1/(1+2n), where cg = cG = 2, 978×1, 06×(empirical std. deviation
of bids). The factor 2,978 follows from the use of triweight kernel instead of the Gaussian kernel. For
the asymmetric the case I only use 10 auctions with (n0 = 2, n1 = 3), 6 auctions with (n0 = 2, n1 = 2),
5 auctions with (n0 = 1, n1 = 2) and 8 auctions with (n0 = 2, n1 = 1).
Appendix 2. Testing
Tests based on means
HHS propose to use the sample analog of the quantile trimmed mean,
ˆ
µn,τ , as a basis of the test. Let
ˆ
bτ,n denote the τth quantile of observed bids. Then
(A2.1)
ˆ
µn,τ ≡ 1Tn×n
∑T
t=1
∑n
i=1
ˆ
vit1{
ˆ
bτ,n ≤ bit ≤
ˆ
b1−τ,n, nt = n}.
(A2.2) H0(PC with symmetry, PC or CC with asymmetry): µn,
−
τ = ... = µ_n,τ
H1(CC): µn,
−
τ < ... < µ
_
n,τ
To test this hypotheses one needs the variances of (
ˆ
µn,
−
τ , ...,
ˆ
µ_n,τ )´. Denote them with (
1
an
−
, ..., 1a_
n
)´ and
let
∑
denote the diagonal covariance matrix. HHS encourage to estimate these by a block bootstrap
procedure where one auction is one block. HHS define the test statistic as
(A2.3)
_
χ
2
=
∑_
n
n=n
−
an(µ∗n,τ −
_
µ)2, where
(A2.4)
_
µ =
∑_
n
n=n
−
an
ˆ
µn,τ∑_
n
n=n
−
an
and
µ∗n
−
, ..., µ∗_
n
denotes the solution to
(A2.5) min
µn
−
,...,µ_
n
∑_
n
n=n
−
an(
ˆ
µn,τ − µn)2 s.t. µn
−
≤ ... ≤ µ_n.
HHS point out that the solution to (A2.5) can be found using the "pool adjacent violators" algorithm
(Ayer at al. (1955)), using the weights an. The p-values are then calculated using equation (A2.6)
from HHS corollary 2. It states that under the null,
_
χ
2
is asymptotically distributed as mixture of Chi-
squared random variables. In practise HHS suggest obtaining the weights w(k; Σ) by simulation from the
MVN(0,
ˆ
Σ) distribution where estimated weights of the chi-squared-bar are defined by the distribution
of the number of activated constraints in (A2.5).
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Under the null PV hypothesis
(A2.6) Pr(
_
χ
2 ≥ c) =∑_n−n−+1
k=2
Pr(χ2k−1 ≥ c)w(k; Σ) ∀ c > 0,
where χ2j denotes a standard Chi-square distribution with j degrees of freedom, and each mixing
weight w(k; Σ) is the probability that the solution to (A2.5) has exactly k distinct values when the vector
{
ˆ
µ
n
−
,t, ...,
ˆ
µ_
n
,t} has a multivariate N(0,Σ) distribution.
A Kolmogorov-Smirnov type test
The second testing approach in HHS uses a smoothed sum of supremum distances between successive
empirical distributions of pseudo-costs. Hence it is called a sup-norm test.
(A2.7)
_
δT =
∑_n−1
n=n
−
sup
vǫ[v
−
,
_
v]


1
nTn
∑T
t=1
∑n
i=1 1{nt = n}Λ(
ˆ
vit − v)
− 1(n+1)Tn+1
∑T
t=1
∑n+1
i=1 1{nt = n+ 1}Λ(
ˆ
vit − v)

, where
Λ(
ˆ
vit − v) = exp((v−
ˆ
vit)/h´)
1+exp((v−
ˆ
vit)/h´)
and h´ = 0.01.
HHS suggest normalizing this distribution. I use Silverman’s rule of thumb bandwidths h, defined
above. HHS show that this test statistic can be approximated with subsampling. They also suggest the
use of a recentering approach by Chernozhukov and Fernandez-Val (2005) where in each subsample, the
test statistic is recentered by the original full-sample test statistic. Then the p-value is computed as
(A2.8) 1S
∑S
s=1 1
{
Ls >
√
T
∑_n−1
n=n
−
√
hT (n)sup
x
[
ˆ
Fn(x)−
ˆ
Fn+1(x)
]}
, where Ls is the following
modified test statistic
Ls =
√
R


∑_n−1
n=n
−
√
hR(n)sup
x
[
ˆ
F
s
n(x)−
ˆ
F
s
n+1(x)
]
−
∑_n−1
n=n
−
√
hR(n)sup
x
[
ˆ
Fn(x)−
ˆ
Fn+1(x)
]

.
s = (1, ..., S) refers to a particular subsample.
ˆ
F
s
n(x),
ˆ
F
s
n+1(x),
ˆ
Fn(x) and
ˆ
Fn+1(x) note the smoothed
functions presented in equation (A2.7). T is the full sample size and R is the subsample size.
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Appendix 3. Testing and robustness checks for the standard testing specification.
Table A3.1 shows the relationship between the p-value and the subsample size. The same subsample
size is used for the distributions of the four and five bidder auctions in testing because there is the same
number (11) of both these auctions. Their subsample size is presented in rows. For the 19 three bidder
auctions a different subsample size is used. This subsample size is presented in columns. The numbers
in the table represent the p-value from the sup-norm test for given subsample sizes with 100 draws. In
practise this robustness check was first conducted with a larger region and to save computer time with
a smaller number of subsamples taken (100 subsamples). All the robustness checks conducted for this
study took about three weeks on a 1300 MHz computer. The relevant region was then checked again with
a larger number of subsamples (500 subsamples). The results are robust for a large range of subsample
sizes. Only the two smallest and two largest possible sizes from both columns and rows show nonrobust
p-values. I choose subsample sizes of 9 for the three bidder auctions and 6 for the four and five bidder
auctions.
Table A3.1. Robustness check for the subsample size. P-values for the sup-norm test with subsamples
for three bidder auctions in columns and for four and five bidder auctions in rows. 100 subsamples taken.
Subsample size for 3 bidder auctions
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 mean
2 0,03 0,00 0,02 0,01 0,04 0,03 0,00 0,02 0,07 0,09 0,07 0,06 0,06 0,11 0,12 0,14 0,16 0,06
3 0,06 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,00 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,07 0,00 0,04 0,05 0,03
4 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,01
5 0,03 0,05 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01
6 0,01 0,06 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01
7 0,05 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
8 0,06 0,05 0,04 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01
9 0,11 0,07 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01
10 0,08 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01
mean 0,05 0,03 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,03Su
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Table A3.2 shows the relationship between the number of subsamples taken and the p-value. The
smaller the amount of subsamples taken, the easier it is to get a wrong result by chance. In this case the
results are robust. To be on the safe side I choose to take 500 draws. As the p-values are now very small,
enough subsamples should be taken to get accuracy in interpreting the results, especially the result zero.
With 500 draws, the p-value zero really means that the p-value is smaller than 1/500 = 0.002.
Table A3.2. Robustness check for the number of subsamples taken. Subsamples size for three bidder
auctions is 9 and for the rest 6.
# of samples p-value
10 0
50 0
150 0.006667
200 0
300 0
400 0.005
500 0
1000 0
2000 0.0025
5000 0.0014
In table A3.3 a summary of the results of conducting the test 50 times are presented. This was done
using the subsample size nine for the three bidder auctions and subsample size six for the four and five
bidder auctions. The number of subsamples taken was 500. Typically this test is just conducted once.
However in some cases there can be qualitative changes in the results from one test draw to another.
Lacking the proper way to choose the correct p-value a cautious researcher should choose the maximum
p-value. Another possibility is to choose the mean. That is the same as conducting the test once with a
larger amount of subsamples taken. In this case with 50 times 500, that is 25000 draws.
Table A3.3. Robustness check for repeating the test. Descriptive statistics of the p-value for 50 rep-
etitions of the test with a given number of subsamples taken (500 draws) and given subsamples sizes (9
for the three bidder auctions and 6 for the rest).
min max mean sd
p-value 0.0000 0.0060 0.0011 0.0015
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Appendix 4. Testing and robustness checks for the standard testing specification with
pooling.
Table A4.1 shows the relationship between the subsample size and the p-value. Differing from the
standard testing specification without pooling, the same subsample sizes are used for both distributions
because the number of auctions in the two pools are almost equal (Tn≤3 = 25 and Tn≥4 = 24). As
subsample size increases the p-value usually decreases. The inference is robust for most subsample sizes.
The robustness was again first checked for the entire region with 100 subsamples taken and then again
for a smaller region with 500 subsamples taken.
Table A4.1. Robustness check for p-values for the choice of subsample size with 100 and 500 subsam-
ples taken.
Subsample size 100 draws 500 draws
2 0.00
3 0.03
4 0.02
5 0.01 0.016
6 0.01 0.022
7 0.02 0.008
8 0.01 0.006
9 0.02 0.012
10 0.01 0.002
11 0.00 0.004
12 0.00 0.000
13 0.00 0.000
14 0.01 0.000
15 0.00
16 0.00
17 0.00
18 0.00
19 0.00
20 0.00
21 0.00
22 0.00
23 0.00
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Table A4.2. shows the relationship between the number of subsamples taken and the p-value with the
subsample size being 9. The results are robust to the number of subsamples taken.
Table A4.2. Robustness check for the number of subsamples taken. Subsample size is 9.
# of samples p-value
10 0
50 0
150 0.00666667
200 0
300 0.00666667
400 0.0025
500 0.002
1000 0.004
2000 0.006
5000 0.0064
In table A4.3 a summary of the results of conducting the test for 50 times are presented. There are no
qualitative changes in the results from one draw to another. Therefore the test is robust to repetitions.
I choose to report the largest p-value.
Table A4.3. Robustness check for repeating the test. Descriptive statistics of the p-value for 50
repetitions of the test for subsample size 9 with number of subsamples taken 500.
min max mean sd
p-value 0 0.0140 0.0063 0.0034
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Appendix 5. Testing and robustness checks for the asymmetric testing specification with
pooling.
Table A5.1 checks the robustness of p-value for the subsample sizes when taking 500 draws for the
group with small distances. Subsample sizes for pool 3 (s=2 and l=3) are presented in rows and subsample
sizes for pool 4 in columns. The results are robust for changes in subsample sizes. I choose to use 5 as
the subsample size for pool 3 and 9 as the subsample size for pool 4.
Table A5.1. Robustness check for the subsample sizes with 500 subsamples taken for the group with
small distances. Subsample size for auctions with less bidders in columns and subsample size for more
bidders in rows.
Subsample size for pool 4
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0.002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0.002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Su
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Table A5.2. shows the relationship between the number of subsamples taken and the p-value with
the subsample size for pool 3 being 5 and the subsample size for pool 4 being 9 for the group with small
distances. Again the results seem to be robust for the entire range of subsamples taken.
Table A5.2. Robustness check for the number of subsamples taken for the group with small distances.
Subsample size for pool 3 = 5 and subsample size for pool 4 = 9.
# of samples p-value
10 0
50 0
150 0
200 0
300 0
400 0
500 0
1000 0
2000 0
5000 0
In table A5.3 a summary of the results of conducting the test for 50 times are presented. There are no
qualitative changes in the results from one draw to another. Therefore the test is robust to repetitions.
As before the maximum is reported.
Table A5.3. Robustness check for repeating the test for the group with small distances. Descriptive
statistics of the p-value for 50 repetitions of the test for subsample size 3 = 5 and subsample size 4 =9
with number of subsamples taken 500.
min max mean sd
p-value 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000 0.0003
51
The first check for the large distance group is presented in table A5.4. Subsample sizes for pool 1
(more bidders) are presented in rows and subsample sizes for pool 2 (less bidders) in columns. The results
seem to be robust for changes in subsample sizes and no qualitative changes exist. As subsample sizes
increase the p-value decreases. I choose to use 5 as the subsample size for pool 1 and 9 as the subsample
size for pool 2.
A5.4 Robustness check for the subsample sizes with 500 subsamples taken for the group with large
distances. Subsample size for less bidders in columns and subsample size for more bidders in rows.
Subsample size for pool 2
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 mean
3 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.50 0.57 0.55 0.56 0.54
4 0.51 0.43 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.52 0.54 0.50
5 0.53 0.49 0.51 0.48 0.47 0.44 0.48 0.47 0.48
6 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.44 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.40 0.45
7 0.51 0.48 0.47 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.44
mean 0.53 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47
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The results shown in table A5.5 seem to be fairly robust for the entire range of the number subsamples
taken.
Table A5.5. Robustness check for the number of subsamples taken for the group with large distances.
Subsample size 1 = 5 and subsample size 2 =9.
# of samples p-value
10 0.40
50 0.46
150 0.43
200 0.43
300 0.47
400 0.49
500 0.46
1000 0.45
2000 0.47
5000 0.46
Table A5.6 shows that in this case there are no qualitative changes in the results from one test draw
to another. Therefore the test is robust to repetitions. As before the maximum is reported.
Table A5.6. Robustness check for repeating the test for the group with large distances. Descriptive
statistics of the p-value for 50 repetitions of the test for subsample size 1 = 5 and subsample size 2 =9
with number of subsamples taken 500.
min max mean sd
p-value 0.44 0.53 0.47 0.02
53
